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This paper develops a general framework for conducting local robustness analysis.  By 
local robustness, we refer to the calculation of control solutions that are chosen so as to 
be optimal against the least favorable model within a small set of possible models.  This 
set is defined local to an initial baseline model.  We provide Nash and Stackelberg 
equilibrium characterizations of the choice of control in such contexts. We then apply this 
abstract formulation to the analysis of how a desire for robustness influences the choice 
of control for discrete time control problems of the type often found in macroeconomics.  
This analysis is conducted using frequency domain methods and is shown to involve 
certain fundamental limits to the efficacy of controls in such environments.  Finally, we 






William A. Brock 
Department of Economics 
University of Wisconsin 
1180 Observatory Drive 




Steven N. Durlauf 
Department of Economics 
University of Wisconsin 
1180 Observatory Drive 




This paper develops elements of a theory of local robustness analysis for 
economic models.  Since the seminal work of Hansen and Sargent (2001,2003a,2003b), 
there is increasing interest in the analysis of economic behavior when agents face 
uncertainty about the structure of the environment in which they operate. Such 
uncertainty has important implications for individual decisionmaking and aggregate 
economic outcomes as well as for policy design. Important contributions to this research 
program include Giannoni (2002), Marcellino and Salmon (2002), Onatski and Stock 
(2002), Onatski and Williams (2003) and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001).  
Robustness analysis differs from standard analyses of behavior under uncertainty 
in two respects.  First, robustness analysis typically focuses on model uncertainty as 
opposed to uncertainty induced by the dependence of outcomes on the realizations of 
stochastic processes.  Model uncertainty means that economic actors cannot fulfill the 
sorts of rationality assumptions that underlie much of modern macroeconomics, i.e. 
assumptions that imply that agents know the underlying structure of the economy.   
Second, robustness analysis, rather than transforming model uncertainty into a standard 
decision under uncertainty problem by placing nontrivial priors on the space of models, 
employs minimax-type methods to alternative actions by an agent.  The minimax 
approaches allow one to treat robustness analysis as a zero sum noncooperative game 
between a policy and an opponent whom we refer to as the adversarial agent whose 
chooses that model within the model space that maximizes the policymaker’s loss.  This 
alters the objective of policy design away from the construction of optimal rules towards 
good rules, i.e. rules that perform well across all the models that are possible. 
In our analysis, we will follow the local uncertainty approach that is employed in 
the robustness literature.  We assume that the model space over which the adversarial 
agent maximizes against the policymaker is described as a small neighborhood around a 
baseline model.  The radius of this neighborhood is assumed to be sufficiently small that 
a first-order Taylor series expansion well approximates the functions that map the radius 
of the model space to the decisions of the policymaker and the adversarial agent.  This 
expansion is constructed around the decisions of the two agents that occur when the 
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radius is zero, i.e. when there is no model uncertainty.  Hansen and Sargent also work 
with local model uncertainty, but do so in the context of recursive structures, primarily 
linear quadratic ones.  Hence, they are able to obtain closed form solutions (of the 
Ricatti) equation to the associated zero-sum game.      
  Relative to the existing robustness literature, we attempt to accomplish three 
things.  First, we develop a theory of local robustness that allows one to use elementary 
calculus tools.  Specifically, we consider model spaces in which individual elements are 
determined by particular values for a vector of parameters.  By considering variations of 
this vector that are small (in the usual norm), we show that one can use basic calculus 
tools to derive robust analogs to optimal control solutions.
1  We are able to provide 
explicit characterizations of how the differences between these robust solutions and 
standard solutions are determined by the second derivatives of the payoff function of a 
policymaker.   Second, we apply this general framework to the analysis of optimal 
feedbacks in a linear quadratic control context and derive implications of a preference for 
robustness in the frequency domain.  This approach develops a link between robustness 
analysis and the existence of design limits in optimal control; see Brock and Durlauf 
(2004) for a discussion of design limits.  We deduce some general implications of 
robustness for how a policymaker assesses uncertainty in the law of motion for the 
system and how the policymaker robustifies his policy rule in the presence of this 
uncertainty. In addition, we make some observations on how our framework relates to 
monetary policy design. 
The introduction of model uncertainty considerations into macroeconomics is, in 
our judgment, an important development and properly reflects the continuing lack of 
consensus among economists on issues both of appropriate microeconomic assumptions 
as well as the inherent difficulties in identifying details of model structure (such as lag 
lengths or possible nonlinearities) once one has specified a particular theoretical 
framework.  Robustness analysis does not represent the only way of addressing model 
                                                 
1See Svensson (2000) for an analysis that provides a “simple” way of understanding 
robustness in the context of some important macroeconomic models.  Our work 
complements this analysis by focusing on properties of robust policies that hold for 
general environments.  Of course, our analysis loses some of the economic substance 
found in Svensson’s work. 
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uncertainty.  Model uncertainty may also be addressed via standard Bayesian methods in 
statistical decision theory, so that the evaluation of expected policy outcomes treats 
model uncertainty as one of the different sorts of uncertainty that determine the 
distribution of outcomes given a policy.  This approach is explored for macroeconomic 
contexts in Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003,2004) and Levin and Williams (2003). Such 
approaches require methods of calculating posterior model probabilities, i.e. probabilities 
that a given model is the “true” one conditional on prior information and available data.  
As such, this requires the analyst to be able to assign prior probabilities to alternative 
models.  These sorts of calculations are explicitly avoided in the robustness approach.  
The assignment of priors is, of course, problematic.  One appealing feature of robustness 
analysis is that it avoids making arbitrary probability assignments.   
This is not to say that robustness analysis represents a good substitute for 
Bayesian approaches in all circumstances.  As argued in Brock, Durlauf, and West 
(2003), robustness analysis is probably most appropriate, compared to the statistical 
decision theory approach, when the model space constitutes a set of models that are all 
local to some baseline model, as is done in the Hansen and Sargent work.
2  The problem 
with model spaces that contain very different (i.e. non-mutually local) models is that one 
highly improbable model can, under the minimax criterion, determine the outcome of an 
analysis, regardless of how improbable it is.  Put differently, we believe that the 
importance of accounting for differences in posterior model probabilities depends on 
context.
3   
                                                 
2Sims (2001) criticizes robust control methods for failing to address non-local model 
uncertainty.  Our view is that the appropriateness of robust approaches to model 
uncertainty depends on context, so that Sims’ criticisms will in some cases certainly be 
salient. 
3An interesting alternative to our approach may be provided by the use of the minimax 
regret criterion. Manski (2004) argues that this criterion is preferable to the minimax 
criterion as it allows the data to implicitly affect the way that models are weighted.   
Specifically, Manski (2004, pg. 1228) argues that minimax can choose “treatment 
zero…regardless of the data.”  The local formulation of the minimax rule, by 
constraining it to a neighborhood of a baseline, allows data to influence policy choices so 
long as the variation of the data helps determine the neighborhood over which model 
uncertainty exists. 
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We therefore consider the local and non-local approaches to model uncertainty to 
be complements, not substitutes.  For example, our local approach is appealing for 
applications where parameters estimated from a sample of size N describes the baseline 
and asymptotic theory instructs us on how fast the radius of model space declines to zero 
with sample size.  It may also apply to contexts where one wishes to import results from a 
well defined baseline situation to a new situation where there is a measure of “nearness” 
of the new environment to the old.  Since interpretations and formulations of robustness, 
ambiguity aversion, etc. are still controversial (e.g. see the discussion in Brock, Durlauf, 
and West, 2003) it seems wise to pursue several approaches at this stage of research.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides our general framework for 
studying local robustness. We consider Nash and Stackelberg equilibria.  In addition, we 
discuss some aspects to robustness that arise when there are multiple discrete alternative 
models. Section 3 develops an analysis of local robustness for univariate discrete time 
systems.  We develop formulas that illustrate how an adversarial agent will choose a least 
favorable model in such an environment and provide a parametric example.  Section 4 
makes some suggestions of how our analysis might inform a monetary authority.  Section 
5 contains summary and conclusions.  
 
 
2. Basic theory  
 
In this section, we describe a general framework for local robustness analysis.  By 
local robustness analysis, we refer to the idea that a policymaker may not know the “true” 
model for some outcome of interest, but may have sufficient information to identify a 
space of potential models that is local to an initial baseline model.  This may be regarded 
as a conservative approach to introducing model uncertainty into policy analysis, in that 
we start with a standard problem (identification of an optimal policy given a particular 
economic model) and extend the analysis to a local space of models, one that is defined 
by proximity to this initial baseline.  The local model uncertainty assumption, in our 
judgment, is naturally associated with minimax approaches to policy evaluation. When a 
model space includes non-local alternatives, we would argue that one needs to account 
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for posterior model probabilities in order to avoid implausible models from determining 
policy choice.  
We consider a policymaker who wishes to minimize a loss function  ( ) , Ju a 
where   is a vector of control variables and 
n uR ∈
m aR ∈  is a vector of parameters.  In 
our context,  ( , Ju a )  is what is referred to as a model.  Standard optimal control for the 
policymaker may be described simply as 
 
  ( ) minimize   ,  over 
n Ju a u R ∈ . (1) 
 
  To understand robust analogs to this standard problem, we analyze this same 
problem under the assumption that the parameter vector is known only up to an 
dimensional ball around the baseline parameter value  m− a , i.e. the agent faces an 
unknown parameter vector a where the only available prior information is that the 
parameter vector lies in the set defined by  
 
  aa ε − ≤  (2) 
 
where  ⋅  denotes Euclidean distance.  Each value of a may thus be interpreted as 
indexing a different model  .    () , Ju a
Robustness analysis does not resolve uncertainty over a by assigning a set of 
probabilities to the interval in which it lies; rather, the choice of control variables is 
assessed relative to the least favorable value of  .  This approach to the choice of 
controls may, as argued by Hansen and Sargent, be interpreted as the search for rules that 
are assured to work reasonably well regardless of the actual model the agent faces out of 
the space of possibilities.  Robustness analysis thus asks how the introduction of model 
uncertainty and minimax behavior alter the behavior of an agent relative to the case 
where the model is known. 
a
As such, and following ideas due to Wald (1950), robustness analysis may be 
interpreted as the analysis of a noncooperative game in which the optimizer faces an 
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opponent, the adversarial agent, whose objective is to maximize the optimizer’s loss.  
This equivalence between minimax analysis and a noncooperative game between the 
policymaker and an adversarial agent has been exploited in the seminal work of Hansen 
and Sargent. The strategy space of the adversarial agent is the space of possible models 
and thus is represented by eq. (2).    We first consider a Nash equilibrium approach to this 
problem; a Stackelberg equilibrium approach is considered below.   
For a Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium control vector   and parameter vector 
 must fulfill two conditions.  For the policymaker, it must be the case that if the 





  () ( )
** * ,,   
n Jua Jua u R ≤ ∀∈ . (3) 
 
Conversely, it must be the case for the adversarial agent that if the policymaker chooses 
, the adversarial agents’s decision fulfills 
* u
 
  () ( )
** * ,,    ,  
m Jua Jua a R a a ε ≥∀ ∈ − ≤ . (4) 
 
As indicated by (4), the adversarial agent chooses the least favorable model among those 
in the model space defined by (2).    
In order to understand the differences in policy that are induced when one moves 







, when  0 ε = . This allows us to consider the effects of 
local model uncertainty when no uncertainty is treated as a baseline. In the subsequent 
analysis, we make the following assumptions:   
 
A1. There exists a family of Nash equilibria  ( ) ( )
** {,}   ua εε ε N ∈ , where N is a small 
neighborhood of 0.  
 
A2.  is  .    J
2 C
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A3.  () () ( ) ( ) ( )
** , 0 for  ,  in an open neighborhood of  0 , 0 a Ju a u a u a ≠ . 
 
A4.  ()  a bounded vector  , which depends on  , such that if  , then  , 0 




A5.   is strictly positive definite  ( , uu Ju a () () ( )
** in an open neighborhood of  0 , 0 ua. 
 
A6.   () () () ( )
** **
0 lim { , } { 0 , 0 } ua ua ε εε → = .   
 
Condition A1 means that we will avoid dealing with issues of existence of an 
equilibrium.  Condition A2 allows us to use elementary calculus methods to analyze 
robustness.  Condition A3 ensures that the marginal effect of a change in the adversarial 
agent’s choice can reduce the payoff to the policymaker at equilibrium and that the 
adversarial agent’s choice is at the boundary of his constraint set for small enoughε . 
Conditions A4 and A5 ensure that the optimal control for the policymaker is bounded and 
that the choice   fulfills the first order necessary condition for optimality with equality.  
Condition A6 means that we assume that the Nash equilibria in our model are continuous 
in 
* u
ε .   
The purpose of these conditions is to impose a certain degree of regularity on the 
optimization problem which will facilitate calculations.  In particular, what matters for 
our analysis is that the first-order conditions of the policymaker that determine   are 
assumed to hold with equality and that the adversarial agent’s choice   lies at the 
boundary of his constraint set for 
* u
* a
ε  sufficiently near 0.  None of the assumptions we 
employ should be regarded as especially onerous; all are made for technical convenience. 
Our first result provides formulas for the optimal decisions of the policymaker 
and the adversarial agent under a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 1: Nash equilibrium robust decisions of a policymaker and an 
adversarial agent 
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Suppose that a policymaker chooses u in order to minimize  ( ) , Ju a whereas an 
adversarial agent chooses a subject to (4) in order to maximize  .  Under 
assumptions  A.1-A.6, for a Nash equilibrium, the adversarial agent will choose 
( , Ju a )
()
*
i a ε defined as  
 
  ()

























ε ε  (5) 
 
and the policymaker will choose 
 
  () () () () () () () ( ) () ()
1 * * ** ** 00 , 00 , 0 0 uu ua uu J u a J u a v o ε εε
−
=− +  (6) 
 
where  ()



























We first calculate  ()
* a ε .  The constrained optimization problem for the 
adversarial agent is the maximization of  
 
  () ()
2 2 , ii
i
LJ u a aa λε
⎛
=+ − − ⎜
⎝⎠ ∑
⎞
⎟  (7) 
 
conditional on the choice of   by the policymaker.  The first order necessary conditions 
for a constrained maximum are 
u
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  ( ) ( )
** ,2  























The regularity conditions above ensure that (9) holds with equality at  ()
* a ε  for ε  near 
0.  Combining eqs. (8) and (9), we have, using the second-order necessary condition to 
determine the sign in (10) below,  
 























Eq. (10) immediately implies (5) using the definition for  ( ) i v ε  that appears in the 
Proposition. Note that the associated vector  ( ) v ε (whose  ’th element is  i () i v ε ) is 
continuous in ε  at  0 ε =  by A1 and A6. 
 To  calculate  ()
* u ε , we start with the first order condition 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
** , u Ju a εε 0 =  (11) 
 
which holds as an immediate consequence of Conditions A4 and A5  Total differentiation 
of (11) with respect to ε  implies, when (11) is evaluated at  0 ε = ,  
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  () () () ( ) () () () ()
*
** ** 0
0, 0 0, 0 0 0 uu ua
du
J ua J uav
dε
+ =  (12)
4
 
so that  
 
  () () () () () () ( ()
*
1 ** ** 0
0, 0 0, 0 0 uu ua
du
Ju a Ju a v
dε
−
=− )  (13) 
 







→ = .   
 
The formulas described by Proposition 1 are quite convenient as they illustrate 
how one can compute locally robust analogs of optimal controls using a set of original 
controls and various first and second derivatives of the loss function.  These formulas 
generalize Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) which considered local robustness against 




An alternative to the Nash approach is the Stackelberg approach in which the 
optimizer is the leader.  In this case, the choice of the parameter value by the adversarial 
agent may be modeled via a reaction function  ( )
* , aR u ε = .  As before, the adversarial 
agent will exhaust the full set of constraints implied by eq. (2).  The Stackelberg 
equilibrium thus requires that 
 
  () () () () () () ( ) ( )
** ,, , ,   
n Ju Ru Ju Ru u R εε ε ε ε ε ≤∀ ∈
                                                
 (14) 
 
4The second term on the left hand side of eq. (12) follows from 






=+  which equals  ( ) 0 v  at  0 ε = . 




  () ( ) a ,a r g m a x  { ,  s u c h  t h a t   Ru Jua a a } ε ε =− ≤ . (15) 
 
  It turns out that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are approximately equivalent, 
as stated in Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. Approximate equivalence of Nash and Stackelberg decisions for 
robust policy problem 
 
Suppose that a policymaker chooses u in order to minimize  ( ) , Ju a whereas an 
adversarial agent chooses   subject to (4) in order to maximize  a ( ) , Ju a.  Suppose that 
the policymaker is the leader in a Stackelberg game in which these choices are made and 
that the adversarial agent’s reaction function is required to fulfill (15). Under assumptions 
A.1-A.6, for small enough ε , the Stackelberg decisions of the two agents will be within 




By analogy to the previous analysis, it is straightforward to verify that 
 
  () ( )


























ε . (16) 
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() () ( ) ( )
()
() () () ()
() ()
() () ( (













dJ u R u
du
dR u
J u Ru J u Ru
du




) ) ε εε ε εε







Total differentiation of (17) with respect to ε  implies 
 
 
() () () ()
( ) () () () () () ()
() () () () () ()













Ju R u Ju R u R u
d
dvu J u R u




εε ε εε ε ε ε
ε
εε ε εε










When  0 ε = , (18) simplifies to  
 
 
() () () ()
( ) () () () () () ()





0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0




J u Ru J u Ru vu
d






Comparing (19) to (12), the only difference between the Nash solution and the 
Stackelberg solution is the additional term  () () () () () ( )
** * 0, 0 0, 0, 0 ua vu Ju R u ′  in (19).  
The m’th term of this vector may be rewritten as 
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  () () () ()
() () () ()























⎜⎟ ∂⎜⎟ ⎛⎞ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
∂
∑
∑  (20) 
  
To determine the value of (20), we employ 
 
 
() () () ()



















⎜⎟ ≡ ⎜ ⎛⎞ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
∑
∑
⎟  (21) 
 
Partial differentiation of (21) with respect to   implies  m u
 
() () () ()
() () () ()() () () ()






























⎜⎟ ∂⎜⎟ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎜⎟







Since, k was arbitrary, comparison of (20) and (21) reveals that  
 
  () () () () () ()
** * 0, 0, 0 0, 0 0 au Ju R u vu ′ =  (22) 
 
 
Hence the Stackelberg solution coincides with the Nash solution up to terms that are of 
order  () o ε  which verifies Proposition 2.  Note that one can perform analogous 
calculations and verify that the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium also 
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coincide up to terms of order  () o ε  if the adversarial agent is the leader.  Proposition 2 is 
useful as it shows that our local robustness analysis does not depend on a particular 
solution concept for the noncooperative game between the policymaker and the 
adversarial agent at least with respect to two important equilibrium notions for such 
models. 
  The equivalence of Nash and Stackelberg solutions appears in a number of 
contexts in game theory.  For example, Hofbauer and Sorin (2002) locate a set of useful 
sufficient conditions for the value of a general zero-sum game to exist and, implicitly, for 
Nash and Stackelberg solutions to coincide.  One may view our results as a local 




One can extend our analysis to consider environments in which there are discrete 
local alternatives to a given baseline model.  This type of formulation seems appropriate 
for a number of macroeconomic contexts. For example, one can consider a baseline real 
business cycle model for which different types of nominal rigidities represent alternative 
directions along which to modify the baseline.  More generally, formulating model 
uncertainty in terms of local discrete alternatives will make sense when there is prior 
information that delimits the directions along which model uncertainty exists.  For each 
of the baseline models, one can perform a robustness analysis of the type we have 
described. 
Once one considers discrete directions along which model uncertainty occurs, a 
new set of questions arise in terms of understanding the dispersions of payoffs and 
policies across the alternatives.  Brock, Durlauf and West (2004) refer to these as 
outcome variance and action variance respectively, and provide a detailed discussion in 
the context of monetary policy rules.  Here, we outline the notions of outcome and action 
variance for our general framework; where outcomes correspond to losses and actions 
correspond to choices of control.  For simplicity, we treat u as scalar. 
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Suppose that there exists a family of   local alternatives to a given baseline 
model 
q
( , Ju a )  that are represented by  
 
  ( ) , , 1... q Ju a l q Q ε += . (23) 
  
where each   is an   vector that describes a direction along which the choice of the 
adversarial agent may vary the baseline  Associated with each of these directions is an 
optimal control choice, 
q l 1 m×
 
  () ( ) ( )
*
u argmax , q ua l J u a l ε += + q ε  (24) 
 
and associated loss 
 
  () ( ) ( )
** , qq Ja l J ua l a l q ε εε += + +. (25) 
 
  To compute the variances of these two quantities, first consider an expansion of 
(24) around  0 ε = ,  
 
  () ( ) ( ) ( )
** *




  () () ( ) () ( )
1 ** * , au u u a ua J uaa J uaa
−
=− ,  (27) 
 
by the first order conditions that determine  ( )
* ua . By the envelope theorem, 
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() ( ) ( )







Ja l J ua l a l







Equations (26) and (28) allow one to calculate the variance of controls and losses up to 
terms of  ()
2 o ε ,  
 
 
( ) ( )
() ()() () ( ) () () ()() () ( ) ()
*
11 2* * * *
var
,, v a r,,
q
uu ua q uu ua
ua l











  () () () () () () () ()
*2 var , var , qa q a Ja l Ju aa lJu aa o
2 ε εε ′ += + . (30) 
 
The formulas (29) and (30) provide a local analysis of the role of the loss function 
 in transmitting underlying model uncertainty into two action variances and outcome 
variances.  There are four main possibilities:  action variance is small (large); outcome 
variance is small (large). Presumably, a policymaker prefers that both the action variance 
and the outcome variance are small; such preferences are often assumed in the monetary 
policy rules literature.    
J
An important feature of eqs. (29) and (30) is the role that the loss function   
plays in contracting or expanding the "baseline" variance, 
J
( ) var q l .   Since the formulas 
that map the first and second derivatives of the loss function with respect to the vectors  a 
and u, the way the loss function does this involves the interactions of many terms.   
  
 
3. Design limits and local robustness in discrete time systems 
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  In this section, we consider the question of the design of locally robust controls 
for a scalar discrete time system.  This sort of model frequently appears in 
macroeconomics contexts.  Our analysis is restrictive in two respects: we focus on scalar 
state systems and we do not address issues of forward-looking elements in the state 
equation; we are pursuing the analysis of vector state systems and forward-looking 
models in subsequent work. 
In this system, t x  denotes the state of the system and   denotes the control that is 
available to the policymaker.  The law of motion for the state is  
t u
 
  ( ) ( ) 11 tt t xA L x B L u t ξ −− = ++  (31) 
 
where the Wold representation of  t ξ  is denoted 
 
  ( ) t wL t ξ ν = . (32) 
 
It is not necessary for the innovations  t ν  to be independent or identically distributed; for 
simplicity we will assume that the innovations have a common variance.  For analytical 
convenience, we assume that   is invertible; we will exploit the fact that in the Wold 
representation, one can always normalize the innovations   so that  , cf. Ash and 
Gardner (1975); we employ this normalization throughout. 
() wL
t v 0 1 w ≡
We consider control rules of the form 
 
  ( ) 1 t uF L x 1 t − − =− . (33) 
 
This means that the state equation may be rewritten as 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) () ( ) 1 tt t x AL FLBL x wLν − =− + . (34) 
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So long as (34) is asymptotically stable,  t x  will possess a spectral density.  In general, it 
is possible for (34) to be unstable; we ignore this issue.  Of course, an important objective 
in monetary policy may well be ensuring stability and so we implicitly confine ourselves 
to policies that do so. 
We assume that the policymaker possesses a loss function 
 
   (35) 
2, JE x =
 
which means that the sole objective of the policymaker is to stabilize the state variable.  
Our analysis may be generalized so that the policymaker also desires to minimize 
variability in the control, but we ignore this for expositional purposes. 
 
Design limits and optimal design 
  
Our analysis of this environment will be facilitated by considering the frequency 
domain analogs of (31) to (34).  We do this because the robustness issues that arise in this 
problem may best be understood as arising from uncertainty about the frequency-specific 
aspects concerning the law of motion for the state, as will become clear shortly.   
Frequency domain approaches to robust policy evaluation are also explored in Hansen 
and Sargent (2003a), Kasa (2000) and Sargent (1999). 
Our approach follows Kwakernaak and Sivan (1972, ch. 6). Throughout, for any 
lag polynomial  , the Fourier transform of its coefficients,  () CL ()()
i Ce C
ω ω









=−∞ ∑ . In analyzing this model, we work with the following transfer 
functions, which describe how shocks, state variables, and controls are interrelated:
5
 
1. the transfer function that relates the control to the state, 
 
                                                 
5Transfer functions such as the ones we employ are valuable in that they allow one to 
identify the response of different aspects of the system (state, control, etc) to sinusoidal 
inputs and as such naturally arise in the frequency domain interpretation of the system. 
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  () ( ) ( ) ( )
1
ii He A e B e
i ω ω ω
−
− =−
ω − , (36) 
 
2. the transfer function for the shocks to the state (when the control is set equal to zero) 
 
  () ( ) ( )
1
ii he A e
ωω ω
−




3. the transfer function from the state to the control 
 
  ( ) ( )
i GF e
ω ω
− = . (38) 
 
In order to identify the effects of the control rule on the variance of the state, it is 
useful to express the variance in terms of frequency-specific contributions.  It is 
straightforward to show that
6
 













+ ∫  (39) 
 
which employs the  () h ω  and  ( ) G ω  functions we have defined.
7 This expression may be 
rewritten as 
 
  () ()
2
2
NC t x ExS fd
π
π ω ωω
− =∫  (40) 
 
                                                 
6Eq. (39) is an immediate implication of Kwakernaak and Sivan (1972), Theorem 6.21, 
pg. 469. 









− =   
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where  () S ω  is called the sensitivity function and is defined by  
 













t x  is defined as the  t x  process under the counterfactual that the control is set equal 
to zero each period, i.e.  
 
  ( ) 1
NC NC
tt xA L x t ξ − = +  (42) 
 
with associated spectral density 
 
  () () ()
2
NC x fh f ξ ω ω = ω . (43) 
 
Notice that  () NC x f ω  does not depend on the control.  The sensitivity function does 
depend on the form of the control via its dependence on  ( ) H ω  and  () G ω .  These 
transfer functions reflect the feedback from the control to the state and state to the control 
respectively, the sensitivity function thus allows for explicit calculation of how a given 
control, working through these two transfer functions, affects the frequency-specific 
variance components of  () x f ω . 
Equation (40) provides a frequency domain perspective on optimal policy design.  
Each possible choice of a control rule  ( ) F L  determines an associated sensitivity 
function  () S ω , as indicated  by eqs. (38) and (41).  Hence the optimal control problem is 
equivalent to finding, among the set of feasible  ( ) S ω  functions the one that minimizes 
(40).  From the perspective of (40), a control can perfectly stabilize the state if and only if 
it is possible that  ()
2
0  S ω ω =∀.  In general, this is impossible since the control rule 
does not allow conditioning on  t ν .  Given this restriction, at first glance, it would seem 
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that minimizing (40) subject to (41) is achieved by setting  ( ) ( ) () FLBL A L = , so that the 
t x  process is reduced to the error term  t ν . In fact, this is the optimal solution if  t ν  is 
uncorrelated. Our interest is in the general case where  t ν  is correlated. 
  What restrictions does the structure of this problem impose on the choice of 
() S ω ?  There exists a general constraint on the choice of  ( ) S ω  known as the Bode 
integral constraint.  The constraint states that  
 





− K = ∫  (44) 
 
where   is a constant that depends on various aspects of eqs. (31)-(32); its exact value is 
defined in the Appendix.  This constraint is critical in understanding optimal policy 
analysis as it characterizes fundamental limits in policy design.  For our purposes, the 




() S ω  to always be less than 1.  Hence, any choice of controls will increase the 
variance associated with at least one set of frequencies relative to what would occur were 
the control not to be implemented.  This represents a fundamental tradeoff in all control 
problems of this type. 
  From the frequency domain perspective, the evaluation of the effects of a policy 
rule may be based on a comparison of the variance of the state produced with the rule 





























A policymaker will want to shape  ( ) S ω  so as to maximize (45). This indicates 
how one may construct optimal policy rules. The Bode integral constraint establishes the 
constraints that must be placed on this maximization problem.  The optimal policy may 
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therefore be conceptualized as the following constrained optimization problem, in which 
the policymaker chooses a sensitivity function to minimize the variance of the state 
subject to the Bode integral constraint (44): 
 
 
() () () ( )
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The first order necessary conditions for minimization imply that  
 





λ = →=  (47) 
  
This implies that the Fourier transform of the optimal feedback rule is implicitly defined 
by  
 























The optimal feedback rule means that the  t x  process is white noise.  This makes intuitive 
sense as the policymaker will use the control to eliminate any (linearly) predictable 
component of the state.  This suggests that the control rule  ( )
*
1 t uF L x − =− t
t
 should have 
the property that when the rule is implemented,  t x v = . By (34), for any control rule 
  () 11 tt uF L x −− =−
 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () () ()
11 tt t
tt
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Therefore, the condition  t x ν =  requires that the optimal feedback rule  ()
* F L −  is 
consistent with 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* 1 ALL BLF LL wL −+ =  (51) 
 
  This argument is heuristic in that it is based on first-order conditions and the class 
of lag operators which span the space of potential policy rules is not precisely defined.  
One can formally prove that the implied optimal policy rule in (51) is in fact optimal. 
 
Proposition 3. Optimal Policy Rule 
 
  Assume that the lag operators  ( ) AL,  ( ) B L  and  ( ) wL are all polynomials of 
finite degree.  The optimal feedback rule to minimize (35) given (31)  is 
 
  () () () () () () () ( ) () ( )
11 *1 1 1 F LB L Lw L LA L B L w L L A L
−− −− −




  We initially consider the case where  t ξ  is white noise, i.e.  ( ) 1 wL= .  In this case, 
defining  () () () ( ) CL AL BLFL =−  one can rewrite the state equation as 
 
  ( ) () ( ) 11 tk t k LC L x r L x t ξ −= Π − =
                                                
 (53) 
 
8For any lag polynomial  ,  () CL ( ) CL
+ denotes the part of the polynomial where all terms 
with negative exponents are dropped; the annihilation operator “+” is discussed in 
Sargent (1987), pg. 292,  Notice that this last expression in (52) exploits the fact  0 1 w =  
in our normalization of the Wold decomposition. 
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where the terms   denote the roots of the finite degree lag polynomial on the right hand 
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The left hand side of (54) is minimized if its log is minimized. We minimize over all   
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− − = ∫  if  1 k r ≤ . 
Hence, the right hand side of (55) is 
2 ln ξ σ .  This gives us a lower bound on the objective 
function; hence a choice of   (via the choice of  k r ( ) FL) that achieves this bound must be 
optimal. The choice,   achieves this bound.  By (54),   0,  k r =∀ k k 0,  k r = ∀  means that 
, hence   () 0 CL=







which corresponds to (52) when  ( ) 1 wL= .  
For general invertible  with  () wL 0 1 w = ,  
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Π− Π− ∫∫  (57) 
 
The same argument as above implies that the lower bound on  is 
2 ln t Ex
2 ln ν σ . This bound 
is achieved if 
 


























  ( ) ( )
* 1 LC L w L −=  (59) 
 
If we expand out (59), using  0 1 w = , 
 
   (60)  ()
2
12 1 2 1 ... 1 ... o Lc c L cL w L wL −+ + = + +
2
 
which makes clear that  () ( ) ( ) ( ) CL AL BLFL =−  is a one-sided polynomial in  , 
completes the proof. 
L
 
This analysis indicates a general strategy for optimal policy construction when the 
model is known.  Intuitively, a policymaker chooses a feedback rule to eliminate any 
predictability in the state.  Further, the calculations involved in the construction of an 
optimal policy in the absence of model uncertainty allow one to develop robust analogs 
of the optimal policy rule when model uncertainty is present.  
Our minimization of   over a class of feedback rules is closely related to 
optimization over a set of stationary states in general capital theory (Marimon, 1989; 
McKenzie, 1986) as well as Woodford’s notion of “optimal from a timeless perspective” 
(Woodford, 2003a, Section 3, Chapter 7 and Section 1.1 Chapter 8). In the notion of 
2
t Ex
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optimization over steady states in Marimon (1989) and McKenzie (1986) one optimizes 
over a set of stationary strategies so that transient effects from historically-given initial 
conditions are ignored. Hence time inconsistencies that arise from discretionary 
optimization from initial conditions that are “reset” every period do not arise.  Since this 
notion of a steady state is timeless there is a direct connection with Woodford’s concept.  
In taking this approach, it is important to remember that the problem of time 
inconsistency must be dealt with in our framework once one moves beyond the class of 
stationary policies considered here.
9
 
design limits and robustness 
 
Our analysis of design limits provides a framework for understanding robustness 
via the role of the Bode integral constraint in determining optimal policy.  For the control 
problem we have just described, suppose that model uncertainty relates to the spectral 
density of the innovation process  t ξ , i.e.  ( ) fξ ω . Uncertainty about  () fξ ω  is a flexible 
way of allowing for uncertainty about the process that describes the state, eq. (31).   
Substantively, our assumption to restrict model uncertainty to uncertainty about  ( ) fξ ω  
implies two restrictions on the policymaker’s information set: first, the policymaker 
knows the autoregressive structure polynomial  ( ) AL, and second, the policymaker 
knows the feedback parameter from the policy rule to the state,  ( ) B L . Notice that this 
prior knowledge still allows for rich forms of model uncertainty as the policymaker does 
not know the impulse response function associated with the innovations  t ν .  Further, 
uncertainty about  () A L  may typically be translated into uncertainty about  .  At 
least metaphorically, the sorts of model uncertainty we allow corresponds to Milton 
() wL
                                                 
9Further, in more elaborate frameworks, such as those with multiple variables to stabilize 
with a given control or various forward looking models, it may not be possible or even 
optimal to make each series unpredictable.  An example of a model where optimal rules 
do not produce white noise series is Woodford (2003b). We thank a referee for these 
observations. 
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Friedman’s famous concern (1948) about long and variable lags in the mapping from 
feedback rules to macroeconomic aggregates.  
  The implications of this type of model uncertainty can be analyzed using the 
results in Section 2.  We focus on the Nash equilibrium between the policymaker and 
adversarial agent; as shown in Section 2, the Stackelberg equilibrium will produce 
identical results up to order ε .   Relative to the  ( ) , Ju a formalism of Section 2,  ( ) p ω  
plays the role of the control vector   and the function  u ( ) fξ ω  plays the role of the 
parameter vector a.  The applicability of the results in Section 2 is not affected by our 
use of functions rather than vectors for local robustness analysis.  At an abstract level, an 
-dimensional vector u  is a map from the set {  to the real line (i.e. each 
component maps to a value on the real line) just as a function is a map from some set   
to the real line.  The derivation of first order necessary conditions for Nash equilibrium 
for functions 
n 1,2,.... } N
S
() p ω  and  () fξ ω  follows the same logic as was employed for the vectors 
 and  , i.e. one employs a variational analysis component by component (i.e. for each 
value of the domain  ) to derive the first order conditions for the best response of each 
side of the noncooperative game.  While there are some technical details in the case of 
functions with a continuous number of "components" in contrast to vectors which have 
only a finite number of components, from the perspective of robustness analysis one 
proceeds exactly as in the vector case of doing calculus with respect to each component, 
i.e. each argument, of the function.  Hence one can proceed as in standard calculus and 
get the right answer.   See any textbook in the calculus of variations such as Kamien and 
Schwartz (1991) for this basic method of deriving first order necessary conditions.   
Indeed our case is much easier because there are no dynamics that have to be considered 
unlike the general case treated in Kamien and Schwartz (1991). 
u a
S
Following our earlier notion we start with a baseline spectral density  () fξ ω  and 
define model uncertainty as meaning that the true spectral density lies in a set defined 
around this baseline, in other words, the set of potential models is defined by all spectral 
densities  () fξ ω  such that 
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  () () ( )
2 2 ffd
π
ξξ π ω ωω ε
− − ≤ ∫ . (61) 
 
This approach to model uncertainty is closely related to that in Sargent (1999).
10  While 
this approach assumes that the policymaker knows  ( ) B L  and  () A L , it is in fact 
relatively general since, from the perspective of 
NC
t x , fairly general uncertainty about the 
spectral density  () NC x f ω  can be generated via uncertainty in  ( ) wL, which as noted in 
footnote 7 determines the spectral density  ( ) fξ ω .   
From this model space, the adversarial agent chooses a spectral density in order to 
maximize 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
* , t Jp f E x ξ ωω =
2  (62) 
 
conditional on the policymaker’s choice  ( )
* p ω  while the policymaker chooses a policy 
rule that robustifies against the adversarial agent’s behavior. We now calculate these 
behaviors. 
For the adversarial agent, the optimal choice  ( )
* fξ ω  may be computed by 
applying the general formula (5) to the model space defined by eq. (61).  This requires 
calculating the version of   that applies to the policy problem we have described. For 
notational consistency, we will define 
i a J
( ) i af ξ ω =  so that the marginal change in loss 
function for a frequency-specific change in the spectral density is  () f J
ξ ω . This partial 
derivative can be calculated using (40) and (47).  The marginal effect of a change in the 
value of  () fξ ω  at a given frequency on  , is 
2
t Ex ()()
2 * ph ω ω ; this follows immediately 
                                                 
10Comparing our eq. (61) and Sargent (1999 eq. (5)), there are two differences. First, we 
do not require all spectral densities in the model space to integrate to the same 
unconditional variance for model errors  t ξ .  Second, we do not assume that the baseline 
spectral density is that of a white noise process. 
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from the frequency definition of the variance and the envelope theorem.  Since the 




  () ()()
2 *
f Jp h
ξ ω ω ω = . (63) 
 
Eq. (63) shows that  () 0  f J
ξ ω ω >∀, which is necessary to allow one to apply (5) to this 
case.
11  B y  ( 4 7 ) ,   ()
* p ω , the Nash equilibrium policymaker’s choice at the baseline 
spectral density  () fξ ω , must fulfill  () ()
1 *
NC x pf ω λω
− = . By (47), we can rewrite this 
expression as  
 












= . (64) 
 
Substituting (63) and (64) into (5), the adversarial agent chooses a spectral density of the 
form 
 
















− =+ + . (65) 
 
  This formula reveals an important feature of how an adversarial agent will 












                                                 
t
11It is important to verify that Assumption A.3 holds for models of this type as there are 
some forms of model uncertainty where the assumption fails. For example, if the state 
equation is  01 1 tt t xA x u ξ −− =+ + , with  t ξ  white noise, if model uncertainty occurs 
because   is not known, i.e. it is only known that it lies in the interval  0 A 00 , AA ε ε ⎡⎤ −+ ⎣⎦ , 
the model will not fulfill A.3 and in fact there will not exist a Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies.    
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is large when  ()
1 fξ ω
−  is large, i.e. when  ( ) fξ ω  is small.  Hence, the adversarial agent 
will increase the relative power at frequencies that contribute relatively little variance at 
the baseline spectral density.  The result may be understood intuitively using the Bode 
integral constraint. A policymaker, because of this constraint, originally chooses a 
feedback rule such that  () S ω  is small at those frequencies at which  () fξ ω  is large. 
Hence, the most effective allocation of spectral power by the adversarial agent is to those 
frequencies whose contributions to the variance of the state have not been downweighted 
by the original feedback rule chosen by the policymaker. 
  To derive a sense of what eq. (65) means operationally, we consider the case 
where the baseline process for  t ξ  is AR(1), i.e.  1 .25 tt t ξ ξν − = + . The associated baseline 
spectral density is, for  ,  
2 1 ν σ =
 
  () ()
1







Figure 1 provides the baseline as well as the adversarial agent’s choice of  ()
* fξ ω . As the 
Figure illustrates, while the adversarial agent adds power to each frequency, the additions 
are smallest at the low frequencies and largest at the high frequencies, which is of course 
what is described by (65). 
  How should a policymaker with an aversion to ambiguity respond to model 
uncertainty about  () fξ ω ?  This question may be addressed immediately by employing 
eq. (47) under the assumption that  ( ) ( )
* ff ξξ ω ω = .  From (47), it must be the case that 
 
  () () ()
2 * ph f ξ
* ω ω ∝ ω  (67) 
 
where the constant of proportionality is implicitly determined by the Bode integral 
constraint.  The robust solution can be quite complex as the adversarial agent’s choice of 
()
* fξ ω  can convert the AR(1) process into a complicated ARMA structure.   
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simple policy rules: an example 
 
  We conclude this section with the analysis of an example of how to use these 
formulas to study robustness in the context of simple rules.
12  Suppose that   and  () 0 AL=
()1 wL L θ =+ ,  1 θ < .  In this case,
NC
t x  is an MA(1) process.  Suppose that a 
policymaker is constrained to follow rules of the form: 
 
  1 t uf x t − = − . (68) 
 
Following our earlier notation,  f corresponds to  and  u θ  corresponds to a, so that this 
model has an associated loss function 
 










Ju a d d d




ππ π ωω ω











The substitution  ()
2 i ae
ω ω θ ≡+ in the last equality in (69) appears in order to make 
clear how the adversarial agent can affect the loss function frequency by frequency.  
  By Proposition 3 above, when there is no model uncertainty, the optimal choice of 
f, 
* f , is defined by 
* f θ =− .  It is straightforward to verify that this solution satisfies the 
second order necessary condition for minimizing  ( ) , Ju a given our assumption that 
1 θ < .  Relative to our abstract formulation, one can interpret  ()
2 i ae
ω ω θ =+  as the 
object chosen by the adversarial agent within a local space.  
  In order to calculate how local model uncertainty affects the choice of feedback 
parameter  f,  we employ eqs. (5) and (6), as before we determine the implicit behaviors 
                                                 
12This example partly builds on Brock and Durlauf (2004)’s discussion of design limits 
and non-time separable preferences. Unfortunately, the printed version of this paper 
contains some typographical errors; corrected text is available from the authors on 
request. 
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so that, using eq. (5), 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )





































ω π ω ω
ε − =− ∫ . (73) 
 
The term   is positive for  uu J 1 θ < , so the sign of the change is determined by the integral 




















Combining (72) and (74), some algebraic manipulation yields 
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  ()() 22
cos cos













where the equality in (75) reflects 
* u θ = − .  Therefore 
 













εθ θ ω θ θ −
++
∝=
++ ++ ∫∫ ω
 (76) 
 
This last integral equals 0, by Formula 2.554.2 of Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (2000). 
Therefore for this particular model, the introduction of local model uncertainty has no 
first order effect on the robustifying policymaker. While this result may not seem too 
exciting, what matters for our purposes is that the finding is far from obvious and our 
general robustness formulas provide a way of doing the calculations necessary to find this 
out.  The result also indicates that just as robust policies can be more or less aggressive 
than policies chosen in the absence of model uncertainty (Brock, Durlauf, and West, 
2003; Giannoni, 2002) it is also possible for the policies to be equivalent in a 
nonpathological case.  
 
 
4. Some implications for monetary policy 
 
  In this section we illustrate some of the implications of the methods we have 
derived for monetary policy.  We do this in the context of a one-dimensional version of 
the Rudebusch-Svensson model developed in Svensson (1996).  In this model, the output 
gap,  , is the control and inflation,  t y t π , is the state variable.  Inflation evolves according 
to 
 
  () ( ) 11 1,   tt t t by πη π ξ η −− =− + + ∈ 0 , 1  (77) 
 
and the policymaker is assumed to wish to minimize the loss function 
2
t Eπ . 
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  In the popular Taylor rule framework, monetary policy analysis is typically 
conducted in the context of simple rules.  For this one-dimensional model, these rules 
may be parameterized by 
 
  12 ty t yy π 1 t ρ ρπ − −− = + . (78) 
 
Without loss of generality, we assume that  t ξ  is uncorrelated and we normalize  .    1 b =
At the baseline parameter, 1 η − , the policymaker will choose the control rule 
() 1 1 t y 1 t η π − =− − − .
13  We consider the question of developing robust versions of the 
optimal monetary policy rules when we index models by the lagged inflation 
coefficient,1 η − .  We therefore consider a set of possible models where the  ’th model 
is associated with lagged inflation parameter 
q
1 q v η η − + .   
  For each model  , we can calculate the (model-specific) Bode constant   as  q q K
 
  () 4 ln 1  if  , 0 otherwise qq q Kv v πη ηη η =− + > .
14 (79) 
 
Therefore the Bode constant for model   is positive if and only if  q q v η η > . 
One can also calculate the  ( ) S ω  function and show that 
 






















Eq. (80) in turn implies  ()
2
1 S ω >  if and only if  
                                                 
1 t
13See Svensson (1996) for the analysis of optimal feedback rules which assume the form 
1 t y π ρ π − = −  for this model. 
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  122 c o s q v η ηω − +> . (81) 
 
How may these calculations be used to inform a policymaker?  Recall that the 
function  () S ω  measures the sensitivity of the state to shocks of frequency ω .  A 
policymaker will want to concentrate on designing monetary policy rules which work 
especially well for those models where the Bode constraint is positive because these 
models will have relatively large sets of frequencies such that  ()
2
1 S ω > ; such 
frequencies are precisely those whose variance contributions to the state will be 
magnified by an adversarial agent.   
This case can also allow one to discuss robustness within and across models: a 
policymaker may be concerned about robustification against local misspecification of the 
exogenous shocks for each of these   separate models.  Put differently, a local “cloud” 
of uncertainty about the spectral density of shocks may exist for each model.  When there 
is also uncertainty about which of the   models is the true one, then there exist two 
layers of model uncertainty in this case.  The Bode integral constraint can help provide 
insight into which of the Q models has the most serious vulnerability to local 
misspecification of the spectral density of the innovation process and at which 
frequencies.  In our view, this is an important area for future research, as it would allow 
for a combination of “global” and local model uncertainty, since there is no requirement 
that the   models are near each other in the way that models with different innovation 




Bode's constraint on  ( ) p ω  tells us that there is a frequency band where 
() 1 S ω > and this band will tend to be larger when the Bode constant,  , is strictly 
positive. Further, the Bode theory tells us that the frequencies most vulnerable to 




ph ω ω  is 
relatively large and, modulo the effect of  ()
2
h ω , those frequencies are the ones where 
() p ω  is relatively larger.  The Bode constraint warns the policymaker that frequencies 
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exist where  () 1 S ω > , i.e. misspecifications are magnified at those particular frequencies 
and it warns the primary agent to be particularly wary of local misspecification of the 
outside shocks when the Bode constant,  , is positive.   The integration of the Bode 
constraint with robustness analysis suggests that a policymaker will be particularly 
concerned to robustify policies against misspecification of the outside shocks when there 
are possible baseline models with positive Bode constants. 
q K
These basic ideas may be used to begin to think about dynamic issues in policy 
analysis.  Here we briefly sketch a sequence of interactions between the policymaker and 
the adversarial agent.  Suppose that the policymaker and the adversarial agent each 
follow simple learning rules in that their decisions at time   depend on their opponent’s 




  () ( ) ( ) ( )
*




  () ( ) ( ) ( )
*
,1 argmin , tt pJ f ξ t p ω ωω − =  (83) 
 
where argmax is taken over the set of spectral densities that satisfy (61).  This type of 
model will produce a sequence of spectral density choices by the adversarial agent; 
following our earlier analysis, the sequence will obey. 
 




















=+ . (84) 
 
In response the sequence of control functions chosen by the policymaker must be such 
that 
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⎟ . (85) 
 
Equations (82)-(85) suggest that interesting issues of policy robustness will arise 
in dynamic contexts, as the least favorable model for the policymaker will evolve across 
time in response to the evolving decisions of the adversarial agent.  We leave formal 
analysis of this question to future work. 
 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper has provided an initial outline of a theory of local robustness.  We 
have provided some general conditions that describe how, in the presence of local model 
uncertainty, robustness policy rules may be analyzed using basic calculus tools.  This 
analysis provides explicit characterizations of the robust analog to an optimal control 
solution and the implied least favorable model for which the robust solution is an optimal 
control.  We apply this basic framework to a discrete time scalar univariate optimal 
control problem.  This necessitated development of a theory of design limits in such 
problems.  Our analysis indicated how robustness considerations imply that a 
policymaker will, for certain types of model uncertainty around a baseline, guard against 
models of the shocks to a system that are less persistent than the baseline model.  Finally, 
we have commented on the implications of this for monetary policy. 
Our analysis provides an initial outline of tools for analyzing local robustness and 
integrating robustness into the analysis of limits to optimal policies.  As such, many 
questions are left unaddressed.  For example, we have not addressed the question of how 
to translate our abstract results on local robustness to dynamic models in which the loss 
function of the policymaker contains more than one argument or where the policymaker 
possesses more than one policy tool. Further, we have not addressed the important 
question of how learning by the policymaker may influence the way in which model 
uncertainty is conceptualized.  Finally, we have not addressed how design limit results 
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are affected by the presence of forward looking elements in the law of motion for the 
states of interest.  Our intent in this paper is to illustrate some basic ideas that we believe 
are important in developing a general theory of policy design that recognizes the 
limitations of current macroeconomic understanding. 
   
 


















Baseline and least favorable spectral densities 
 when ξt = 0.25ξt-1+νt , σν
2 = 1 and  ε =.01 
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Appendix. Bode Integral Constraint 
   
  In this appendix, we provide a description of the integral constraint formula to 
indicate how the constant   in eq. (44) is determined. To do this, one starts with  K ( ) L ω , 
which is the transfer function that describes how shocks “move around the loop” 
frequency by frequency and is defined as 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) LH G ω ωω = . (86) 
 
 By (36) and (38), (86) may be written as  
 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1




ω −  (87) 
 
and so may be factored as 
 

























The constant   is determined by the requirement that the system is stable.  The quantities 
 are known as zeroes and the quantities 
c
i z i p  are known as poles.  The difference between 
the number of zeroes and the number of poles,  nm ν = − , is known as the relative degree 
of  () L ω .  We assume that  1 ν ≥ , which will generally be the case since the policymaker 
cannot use current  t x  in choosing the control. 
  The following result is due to Wu and Jonckheere (1992). 
      
Theorem.  Discrete Generalized Bode Constraint 
 
Assume that the controlled system is globally asymptotically stable and that  1 ν ≥ . Then,  
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− = ∑ ∫  (89) 
 
where 
i u p denotes an unstable pole of  ( ) L ω .  
  It is important to note that it is possible for 
NC
t x  to be either difference stationary 
(i.e. contain a unit root) or be explosive. What matters in our formulation is that the 
choice of  () F L eliminates either form of nonstationarity.  Lemma 5 of Wu and 
Jonckheere (1992) indicates that when  
NC
t x  contains a unit root, (which means that 
1 r = , the value of the right hand side of (89) is 0 whereas if 
NC
t x , it is explosive. 
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